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MACK V. OTIS ELEVATOR: CREATING
MORE SUPERVISORS AND MORE
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR WORKPLACE
HARASSMENT
JODI R. MANDELL
"Where have all the employees gone... Gone to supervisors
every one ....
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment is a pervasive problem in the workplace.2
To prevent and remedy this problem, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19643 makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an individual on the basis of sex.4  Title VII is violated
not only by economic or tangible discrimination, but also when
sexual harassment is so severe or pervasive that it alters the
conditions of employment and creates an abusive working
environment.' With respect to this latter form of harassment,
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1997,
Brandeis University.
' Craig Becker & Diana Orantes Ceresi, Toward a Rational Interpretation of the
Term "Supervisor" After Kentucky River, 18 LAB. LAW. 385, 385 & n.** (2003),
http://www.bnabooks.com/ababna/laborlawyer/18.3.pdf (stating "[w]ith apologies to
Pete Seeger").
2 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798 (1998) ("It is by now
well recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors (and, for
that matter, coemployees) is a persistent problem in the workplace."); EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL
HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html
(last modified June 21, 1999) (stating that the number of sexual harassment charges
filed with the EEOC and state fair employment practices agencies increased from
6,883 in fiscal year 1991, to 15,618 in fiscal year 1998).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
4 See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also infra Part I.A. (explaining
how employers are vicariously liable for supervisor sexual harassment under Title
VII).
5 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (describing how
quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims both violate Title VII, and how
the latter requires severe or pervasive harassment); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786
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known as hostile work environment sexual harassment,
employers may be subject to vicarious liability when the hostile
work environment is created by a supervisor, but not when it is
created by a coworker.6 Therefore, it is critical to determine
whether the harassing employee is a supervisor, or merely a
coworker, for Title VII purposes. However, determining who
qualifies as a supervisor has been a source of confusion for the
courts, because the term is not contained in Title VII and has not
been defined by the Supreme Court.7 Recently, in Mack v. Otis
Elevator Co.,8 the Second Circuit interpreted broadly the term
''supervisor" as one whose authority "enabled or materially
augmented" his or her ability to create a hostile work
environment.9 This broad definition appears to be inconsistent
not only with the Supreme Court's holdings in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth ° and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,1
the principal cases for analyzing vicarious liability in Title VII
hostile work environment cases, but also with the agency
(summarizing what constitutes actionable discrimination under Title VII); Meritor
Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) (explaining that sexual harassment, which
creates a hostile work environment, violates Title VII).
6 See Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1016 (2003). When a coworker creates a hostile work environment, the
employer can be liable where it knew or should have known of the harassment but
failed to take appropriate corrective measures. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759 ("An
employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have
known about the conduct and failed to stop it."); Browne v. Signal Mountain
Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 910 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing Williams v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999)) (describing the elements a
plaintiff must prove when the harasser is a coworker); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills
Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 970 (D. Minn. 1998) (explaining that if the
harasser and plaintiff were coworkers, the employer would only be liable under a
negligence standard).
' See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that Title VII does not provide a definition of the term "supervisor");
Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 912 ("The definition of the term 'supervisor' for Title VII
purposes is a question that has divided the courts."); Stephanie Ann Henning
Blackman, Note, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts' Confusion
Regarding the Definition of "Supervisor," 54 VAND. L. REV. 123, 124 (2001) (noting
that while Ellerth and Faragher clarified the standard for employer liability, they
also caused confusion among lower courts in determining who qualifies as a
supervisor).
' 326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003).
9 Id. at 126.
10 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
" 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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principles and Title VII objectives upon which the Court relied. 2
In Mack, the plaintiff worked as an elevator mechanic's
helper for defendant, Otis Elevator Company, and was assigned
to assist six mechanics at the Metropolitan Life building in New
York City.13 The collective bargaining agreement between Otis
and the elevator constructors' union provided that whenever
there were five or more employees on one job, as there were at
the Metropolitan Life building, one mechanic was to be
designated "mechanic in charge."'14  Under the terms of the
agreement, the mechanic in charge had responsibility for
allocating the work assigned by management, checking the
quality of the work, and monitoring safety in the workplace. 5
The plaintiff claimed that from her first day on the job, Connolly,
the mechanic in charge, made frequent sexual comments,
regularly changed out of his uniform in front of her, boasted often
of his sexual exploits, and on one occasion pulled her onto his lap,
touched her buttocks, and tried to kiss her. 6 The plaintiff filed
suit under Title VII, alleging a hostile work environment,
constructive discharge, and retaliation.17  The district court
granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on all of the
plaintiffs claims.'8 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's judgment except for the plaintiffs hostile work
environment claim, as to which the judgment was vacated and
the case remanded. 19
In evaluating the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim,
the Second Circuit first determined that a reasonable jury could
conclude 'that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory
intimidation that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
12 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
13 Mack, 326 F.3d at 120.
14 id.
"5 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 00 CIV 7778 LAP, 2001 WL 1636886, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2001), affd in part and vacated in part, 326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2003). But see Mack, 326 F.3d at 120 (describing the responsibilities of the mechanic
in charge as "the right to assign and schedule work, direct the work force, assure the
quality and efficiency of the assignment, and to enforce the safety practices and
procedures"' (quoting Collective Barganing Agreement between Otis and Local 1
International Union of Elevator Constructors)).
16 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 120.
17 Id. at 122.
1" See Mack, 2001 WL 1636886, at *1.
'9 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 130.
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conditions of [his or] her work environment."'2 ° The Second
Circuit next evaluated whether a basis existed for imputing to
the employer the conduct that created the hostile environment.21
To determine whether liability should be imputed to Otis, the
Second Circuit relied on two Supreme Court decisions,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth22 and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,23 which together provide the basis for analyzing
vicarious liability under Title VII hostile work environment
cases.
24
Under Ellerth and Faragher, an employer can be held
vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by
supervisory employees. 25 The Court did not provide specific
criteria for determining which employees qualify as supervisors,
except to state that a supervisor has "immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee., 26 However, in a later case,
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Illinois, Inc.,27 the Seventh
Circuit defined "supervisor" as one who has "the power to hire,
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee. 28
Although other circuit and district courts adopted the Parkins
20 Id. at 122 (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v. New York State Dep't
of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999)).
21 id.
22 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
23 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
24 Mack, 326 F.3d at 123 (stating that Ellerth and Faragher "together provide
the bedrock upon which the current law of vicarious liability in Title VII hostile
work environment cases is built").
25 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court in Ellerth
and Faragher held that:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also infra Part I.B
(discussing the Ellerth and Faragher standard for workplace harassment). Prior to
Ellerth and Faragher, an employer would not automatically be liable for hostile work
environment sexual harassment by a supervisor unless the employer knew or should
have known of the hostile work environment and failed to take corrective action. See
Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 966 (D. Minn.
1998) (explaining how Ellerth and Faragher changed the standards for employer
liability).
26 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
27 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998).
28 Id. at 1034.
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test,29 the Second Circuit rejected this test and instead focused on
"whether the authority given by the employer to the employee
enabled or materially augmented the ability of the latter to
create a hostile work environment for his or her subordinates."3
The Second Circuit's test relied both on those courts that did not
define "supervisor" so narrowly3 as well as on the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") enforcement
guidelines.32  Because Connolly directed the plaintiffs work
activities and was the senior employee on site, the Mack court
concluded that Connolly was in fact the plaintiffs supervisor, and
that Otis would be vicariously liable for Connolly's acts, unless
Otis could establish an affirmative defense.33
It is submitted that the Second Circuit defined too broadly
the term "supervisor" when it relied on the harasser's ability to
direct work activities, rather than the authority to hire, fire,
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee. This
29 See, e.g., Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 334 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that the harasser did not have the authority to take tangible employment actions
against the plaintiff and only the authority to occasionally direct her operational
conduct); Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 00 CIV 7778 LAP, 2001 WL 1636886, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2001), affd in part and vacated in part, 326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir.
2003) (noting a "distinction 'between low-level supervisors who were the equivalent
of [coworkers] and supervisors whose authority and power was sufficient to make
consequential employment decisions affecting the subordinate, such that the
supervisor was effectively acting on the employer's behalf"' (quoting Parkins, 163
F.3d at 1033)); Trigg v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 99-CV-4730, 2001 WL
868336, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (recognizing that the Second Circuit did not
yet establish criteria for identifying a supervisor versus a coworker, but that the
Seventh Circuit adopted a "sound statement on how to differentiate the two"), affld,
No. 01-9104, 2002 WL 1900463 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2002); Kent v. Henderson, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 633-34 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (concluding that the harasser was not the
plaintiff's supervisor because he did not have "authority to hire, fire, re-assign, or
demote her or set her work schedule or pay rate" nor did he have the "power to take
tangible employment action against her or affect her daily work activities").
30 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1016 (2003).
3" See id. at 126-27 (citing Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 1254, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2001) and Kent, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 634).
32 See id. at 127 (finding persuasive the EEOC's definition of "supervisor"); see
also infra Part I.C (describing the EEOC enforcement guidelines).
33 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 127. When no tangible employment action is taken, an
employer may raise an affirmative defense, which comprises two elements: (1) "that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior;" and (2) "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or
to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.775, 807 (1998).
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Comment asserts that the Second Circuit should have considered
the fact that the alleged harasser and the plaintiff were both
members of the same union, and that the harasser, therefore, did
not have the authority to make such economic decisions affecting
the plaintiff. This ability to make economic decisions seems to
distinguish a supervisor from a mere coworker and to ensure that
the individual was aided in accomplishing his or her sexual
harassment by his or her position as an agent of the employer.
Not only does the Second Circuit definition seem to part from the
agency principles and Title VII objectives upon which the
Supreme Court relied, it also appears to contradict the definition
of "supervisor" in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").34
While the NLRA definition does not have to be consistent with
the Title VII definition, it can be helpful in determining which
employees should qualify as supervisors for Title VII purposes.
The Second Circuit's test will likely make it more difficult for
companies to distinguish between coworkers and supervisors and
may have negative implications on company training and
monitoring. It is suggested that the Second Circuit should have
defined the term "supervisor" as one who has the authority to
take or to recommend tangible employment actions 35 against his
34 29 U.S.C § 152(11) (2000). The NLRA defines "supervisor" narrowly, as "any
individual having authority.., to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees." Id. Although the definition
includes the responsibility "to direct" the employee within the definition of
"supervisor," the use of "direct" is still narrow, as it is only conclusive if "the exercise
of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature," as the direction of
another employee must include "the use of independent judgment." Id.35 "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The following are characteristics of a tangible
employment action:
1. A tangible employment action is the means by which the supervisor
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates, as
demonstrated by the following:
- it requires an official act of the enterprise;
it usually is documented in official company records;
- it may be subject to review by higher level supervisors; and
it often requires the formal approval of the enterprise and use of its
internal processes.
2. A tangible employment action usually inflicts direct economic harm.
3. A tangible employment action, in most instances, can only be caused by
a supervisor or other person acting with the authority of the company.
EEOC, supra note 2.
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or her subordinate employees.
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of Title
VII and the EEOC guidelines, as well as the Supreme Court's
vicarious liability standard under Ellerth and Faragher. Part II
will explain how the definition of "supervisor" has been a source
of confusion for the lower courts. Part III will analyze the Second
Circuit's definition of "supervisor" in Mack, and how it applied
the Ellerth and Faragher standard for workplace harassment.
This section will also discuss how the Second Circuit's definition
seemingly contradicts the definition of "supervisor" provided in
the NLRA. It will also focus on the reasons why supervisory
employees are excluded from the bargaining units of their
subordinates under the NLRA, and compare that to the rationale
behind the vicarious liability of employers for harassment by
their supervisors. This section will include a discussion of the
negative implications of the Second Circuit's holding. Finally,
Part IV will propose how courts should distinguish between
supervisors and coworkers.
I. AN EMPLOYER'S VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits sex discrimination
in employment.36 Specifically, Title VII makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."37 Sexual
harassment is a form of sex-based employment discrimination
prohibited by Title VII.38
Title VII does not contain or define the term "supervisor."39
36 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
37 id.
38 See Eflerth, 524 U.S. at 752 ('Title VII is violated by either explicit or
constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of employment .... ); Meritor
Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (explaining that sexual
harassment as defined by the EEOC is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII).
'9 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also EEOC, supra note 2 (explaining that the
20051
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To determine employer liability under Title VII for sexual
harassment by supervisors, courts have looked to Title VII's
definition of the term "employer., 40  The term "employer" is
defined under Title VII as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees... and
any agent of such a person.' The Supreme Court has concluded
that by including the term "agent" within the definition of
employer, Congress intended to invoke traditional agency
principles.42 Such agency principles, however, according to the
Court "may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title
VII" and should be considered in light of the statute's objectives.43
The primary objective of Title VII is to avoid harm by
preventing violations, while a secondary goal is to provide a
remedy for discrimination.' Congress, recognizing that
employees lack bargaining power, gave employees statutory
rights and imposed upon employers an obligation to screen, to
train, and to monitor supervisors who might violate those
rights.45 Congress also designed Title VII to encourage the
federal employment discrimination statutes do not define the term "supervisor").
'0 See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70-72 (evaluating employer liability based on
Title VII's definition of "employer").
4' 42 U.S.C § 2000e(b).
42 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763 ("[Algency principles constrain the imposition of
vicarious liability in cases of supervisory harassment."); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 n.3 (1998) ("[O]ur obligation here ... is to adapt agency
concepts to the practical objectives of Title VII."). Since Title VII was amended to
include the prohibition against sex discrimination at the last minute on the floor of
the House of Representatives, there is little legislative history to guide courts in
interpreting the Act. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64. However, the Court considered
the fact that Congress amended Title VII after its Meritor decision without
modifying the holding to be an affirmation of its statutory interpretation. See
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763-64; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792.
41 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 n.3; Meritor, 477 U.S. at
72 (noting that Congress wanted courts to rely on agency principles for guidance in
this area but cautioning that courts should also take into consideration the purpose
of Title VII).
4 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06 ("Although Title VII seeks 'to make persons
whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination,' its
'primary objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is
not to provide redress but to avoid harm.") (citations omitted) (quoting Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975)); EEOC, supra note 2 (stating that
"[w]hile the anti-discrimination statutes seek to remedy discrimination, their
primary purpose is to prevent violations").
45 See Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1265
(M.D. Ala. 2001) (stating reasons why Title VII holds employers liable for
supervisory sexual harassment).
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creation of sexual harassment policies and effective grievance
procedures. 6 By "encouraging forethought by employers and
saving action by objecting employees,"47 Congress sought to
"promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII
context."48  Finally, by invoking agency principles, Congress
revealed an intention to place some limits on employer liability.
49
B. The Ellerth and Faragher Standard for Workplace
Harassment
Ellerth and Faragher provide the basis for analyzing
employer vicarious liability in a Title VII hostile work
environment claim. ° According to these cases, an employer is
not always vicariously liable for a hostile work environment.'
Rather, liability depends on whether the person charged with
creating the hostile environment is the plaintiffs "supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee."52 If the harassing employee is a supervisor, and he or
she took a "tangible employment action" against the plaintiff, the
employer will be strictly liable. 3 If, however, the supervisor did
not take a tangible employment action against the plaintiff, the
employer may raise as an affirmative defense that it "exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and.., that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
4 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
41 Id. (accommodating agency principles and Title VII policies); Faragher, 524
U.S. at 807 (incorporating Title VII policies into its holding).48 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764.
49 See id. at 763 ("[A]gency principles constrain the imposition of vicarious
liability in cases of supervisory harassment."); Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court also suggests that Title VII incorporates the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, "and the considerations which animate 
that
doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability 
in certain
circumstances." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764. The avoidable consequences doctrine, 
also
known as the "mitigation-of-damages doctrine," requires a plaintiff to alleviate 
the
effects of an injury or breach. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (7th ed. 1999).
50 See Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir.) (basing its vicarious
liability analysis on Ellerth and Faragher), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003);
Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 911 (E.D. Tenn.
2003) (analyzing employer vicarious liability by starting with Ellerth and Faragher).
5, Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
52 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
3 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
20051
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harm otherwise. '54  If the harassing employee is not theplaintiffs supervisor, but rather a coworker, liability exists onlyif the employer was negligent.55 Under a negligence standard, aplaintiff must prove that the employer knew or should haveknown of the hostile work environment, but failed to take the
proper corrective measures. 5 6
The Supreme Court did not actually define the term
"supervisor" in Ellerth or Faragher; however, it did provideinstructive guidance in determining who may qualify as a
57supervisor. For example, the Court seemed to indicate that tobe a supervisor, the alleged harasser should be given a
significant amount of authority by the employer. 8  Such
authority, according to the Court, should include more than
simply directing the work of others, but rather should include the
ability to take or to recommend a tangible employment action. 9The Court also seemed to suggest that employers should have
some control over their supervisors' behavior through screening,
training, and monitoring so as to better prevent discrimination.60
Finally, given the amount of authority that supervisors should
possess and the level of control that employers should have over
their supervisors, the Court seemed to reveal that supervisors
should be a select group of employees.6'
1. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
Kimberly Ellerth, a salesperson at one of Burlington's
divisions, alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment byher supervisor, Ted Slowik.62 Ellerth claimed that Slowik made
offensive remarks and gestures as well as unfulfilled threats to
affect her terms and conditions of employment.63 Slowik was notEllerth's immediate supervisor, but was a mid-level manager
who "had authority to make hiring and promotion decisions
14 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
55 See supra note 6.56 See supra note 6.
57 See discussion infra Part I.B.1-2.58 See discussion infra Part I.B.1-2.
59 See discussion infra Part I.B. 1-2.
60 See discussion infra Part I.B.1-2.
61 See discussion infra Part I.B.1-2.
62 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998).
63 Id. at 747-48.
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subject to the approval of his supervisor. 64 The Court accepted
the district court's finding that Slowik's behavior was severe and
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment.
65
To determine whether Burlington should be held vicariously
liable for Slowik's actions, the Court focused primarily on agency
law principles.66 First, the Court evaluated section 219(1) of the
Restatement Second of Agency,67 and concluded that, as a general
rule, "sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within
the scope of employment., 68  The second basis of liability on
which the Court focused was section 219(2) of the Restatement.69
The Court determined that section 219(2)(d), the "aided in the
agency relation" standard, was the proper ground for imposing
liability on an employer for a supervisor's sexual harassment.
7 °
The Court noted that most employees are aided by the
existence of the agency relation by mere proximity and regular
contact to one another in the workplace. 1  These factors alone,
however, cannot satisfy the agency relation standard, because
"an employer would be subject to vicarious liability not only for
all supervisor harassment, but also for all co-worker
harassment," a result which would be undesirable according to
64 Id. at 747.
65 Id. at 754.
66 Id. at 754-64. The Ellerth Court stated that because the Title VII definition of
the term "employer" includes the term "agents," Congress has directed federal courts
to interpret Title VII based on agency principles. Id. at 754.
67 See id. at 755-57. Section 219(1) of the RESTATEMENT states the following: "A
master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in
the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958).68 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
69 Id. at 758-59. Section 219(2) of the RESTATEMENT states the following:
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 219(2).
70 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759-60 ("When a party seeks to impose vicarious liability
based on an agent's misuse of delegated authority, the Restatement's aided in the
agency relation rule, rather than the apparent authority rule, appears to be the
appropriate form of analysis.").
7" Id. at 760.
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the Court.72 The Court stated that a supervisor is "empowered by
the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic
decisions" and is aided by the agency relation because of his orher unique ability to take tangible employment actions.73
Therefore, although the Court did not specifically define whoqualifies as a supervisor, it did note the importance of the
supervisor's ability to take tangible employment actions against
a subordinate employee.
In determining Burlington's liability, the Court also
considered the purpose and goals of Title VII.74 More specifically,
the Court suggested that basing employer liability in part on an
employer's efforts to create anti-harassment policies and effective
grievance mechanisms would serve Title VII's deterrent purpose
and effectuate Congress' intention to limit litigation. 7' The Court
also indicated that limiting employer liability might encourage
employees to report sexual harassment before it becomes severe
76or pervasive. 6 The Court's suggestions seem to support a narrow
and consistent definition of "supervisor," which would limit an
employer's liability by providing realistic limitations on who maybe considered a supervisor, as well as offer an incentive for
companies to implement preventive measures.
2. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
Faragher, decided the same day as Ellerth, also involved adetermination of when an employer may be held liable underTitle VII for a hostile work environment created by supervisory
employees.77 The Court applied the same rationale as it did in
Ellerth, evaluating agency principles, 7 as well as Title VIIpolicies, 79 to conclude that the city of Boca Raton was vicariouslyliable to the plaintiff for the actionable hostile work environment
72 Id. (noting that the aided in the agency relation standard "requires the
existence of something more than the employment relation itself").73 Id. at 762 (stating that "[t]angible employment actions fall within the specialprovince of the supervisor" and "are the means by which the supervisor brings the
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates").
'4 Id. at 764.
75 id.
76 Id.
77 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).78 Id. at 793-803.
79 Id. at 805-07.
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created by supervisory employees.8 °
Beth Ann Faragher, a part-time lifeguard for the city of Boca
Raton, alleged that her supervisors, Bill Terry and David
Silverman, created a hostile work environment at the beach "by
repeatedly subjecting Faragher... to 'uninvited and offensive
touching,' by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in
offensive terms."'" Terry, who was Chief of the Marine Safety
Division, had "authority to hire new lifeguards (subject to the
approval of higher management), to supervise all aspects of the
lifeguards' work assignments, to engage in counseling, to deliver
oral reprimands, and to make a record of any such discipline."
82
Silverman, a lieutenant who was later promoted to captain, had
responsibility for "making the lifeguards' daily assignments, and
for supervising their work and fitness training." 3  The Court
considered both men supervisors, because they had "virtually
unchecked authority" over the plaintiff, "'directly controll[ing]
and supervis[ing] all aspects of [Faragher's] day-to-day
activities,"' and because the plaintiff and her colleagues were
"'completely isolated from the city's higher management.' 8 4
The Faragher decision seemingly raises the issue of whether
supervisory authority must include the ability to take a tangible
employment action, or whether directing daily work activities is
sufficient to impose supervisory status. Since only one of the
supervisors clearly had authority to take tangible employment
actions, the EEOC and some courts have concluded that in order
for an individual to be considered a supervisor, he or she need
only possess the authority to direct work activities.85 On the
'0 Id. at 808.
81 Id. at 780 (quoting Plaintiffs Complaint, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864
F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (No. 92-8010)).
" Id. at 781.
83 id.
8 Id. at 808 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1544 (11th
Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), rev'd, 524 U.S. 775
(1998)).
85 See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.) (adopting
an expansive definition of "supervisor"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003); Dinkins
v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(holding that an employee is a "supervisor" if he can "direct another employee's day-
to-day work activities in a manner that may increase the employee's workload or
assign additional or undesirable tasks"); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr.,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. Minn. 1998) (noting that the Faragher court did not
consider the power to take a tangible employment action to be dispositive); EEOC,
supra note 2 (noting that in Faragher there was no question that the Court viewed
20051
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW
other hand, "one can infer from the unique circumstances in
Faragher that the individual defendants had effective control
over more than just daily work activities. ' 6  For example, the
Court described the work routine as a "paramilitary
configuration" with a strict line of command in which lifeguards
reported to lieutenants and captains, who in turn reported to
Terry, the Chief of the Division. 7  This type of work
environment, combined with the complete isolation of the
Division, indicates that both harassers likely had the power to
discipline the plaintiff and exercised considerable control over
her as well. 8 Therefore, it seems that the Court did not intend to
define the term "supervisor" as one who has the authority only to
direct other employees' work activities, but rather as one who can
take or recommend tangible employment actions.
Faragher gave other indications that a supervisor's authority
should include the ability to take or recommend tangible
employment actions. For example, the Court suggested that an
employee cannot respond to a supervisor's harassment in the
same way he or she would respond to harassment by a coworker
because of the supervisor's power "to hire and fire, and to set
work schedules and pay rates."' 9 The mere fact that supervisors
have this special authority, even if they do not exercise it,
enhances supervisors' ability to create a hostile work
environment for subordinate employees. 90 Finally, the Court
pointed out that supervisors are fewer in number, giving
employers a greater opportunity to screen supervisors, to train
both of the harassers as supervisors even though only one of them had authority to
take tangible employment actions).86 Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 917 (E.D.
Tenn. 2003).
87 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781; see also Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 917 (describing
the work environment in Faragher as having a formal hierarchy and rigid
discipline).
88 See Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 917-18 (commenting that higher ranking
officers in paramilitary organizations might not have the authority to hire or fire
other employees, but they do have significant power to discipline and to control
subordinates).
89 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803 (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 813, 854 (1991)). The Court noted that "[w]hen a fellow employee harasses, the
victim can walk away or tell the offender where to go, but it may be difficult to offer
such responses to a supervisor." Id.
90 See id. at 801-02, 805 (noting that supervisors have special authority, even if
not explicitly invoked, that aids them in sexually harassing subordinate employees).
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them, and to monitor their performance. 9 Imposing supervisor
status on employees who simply have authority to direct other's
work activities would seemingly create many more supervisors
than the Court had contemplated.92
C. The EEOC's Guidelines
After the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the EEOC revised
its enforcement guidelines regarding employer liability for
supervisory harassment under Title VII.93 The guidelines point
out the importance of determining whether the alleged harasser
had supervisory authority over the complainant employee and
provide suggestions for making that determination.94 First, the
guidelines suggest that the principles of agency law as well as
the purpose of Title VII and the reasoning of the Supreme Court
should be considered.95 Second, the alleged harasser's authority
"must be of a sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment., 96 Finally,
the determination should be fact-specific rather than based
simply on the alleged harasser's job title.9
7
Adopting a broader definition of "supervisor," the EEOC
considers an employee to be a supervisor where the employee has
the authority to: (1) take or to recommend tangible employment
actions affecting another employee; or (2) direct another
9' Id. at 803.
92 See infra notes 170-73.
93 EEOC, supra note 2 ("This document supersedes previous Commission
guidance on the issue of vicarious liability for harassment by supervisors."). The
EEOC's enforcement guidelines are not binding on courts; however, some courts
have found them persuasive. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 127
(2d Cir.) (drawing support from the EEOC enforcement guidelines), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1016 (2003); Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding persuasive the EEOC enforcement guidelines), aff'd, No. 03-7662, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3383 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2004); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (stating that EEOC guidelines, ""while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance'"')
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) and Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). But see Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 913
(finding unpersuasive the EEOC's definition of "supervisor").
9 EEOC, supra note 2.
95 See id.
96 Id.
97 id.
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employee's daily work activities. 98 The guidelines state that an
individual qualifies as a supervisor if the individual has the
power to take tangible employment actions against the employee,
even if an individual's tangible employment decision is subject to
review by a higher level supervisor.99 "As long as the individual's
recommendation is given substantial weight by the final
decisionmaker(s), that individual meets the definition of
supervisor."'' 00 Further, the EEOC guidelines state than an
individual who could not make tangible employment decisions,
but who is authorized to direct the employee's daily work
activities, could qualify as a supervisor.0 1 However, the EEOC
then qualifies this ability to direct work activities by stating that
if the person simply "relays other officials' instructions regarding
work assignments" or "directs only a limited number of tasks or
assignments," the person would not qualify as a supervisor.'0 2
II. LOWER COURTS' APPLICATION OF ELLERTH AND FARAGHER
The lower courts have interpreted differently the Ellerth and
Faragher standard for workplace harassment. 3 For example,
the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, as well as several district
courts, have narrowly defined the term "supervisor" and have
concluded that supervisory authority consists primarily of the
ability to take a tangible employment action.' °4 These courts
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
'0' Id. at 6.
102 Id.
103 See Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 (E.D.
Tenn. 2003) ("The definition of the term 'supervisor' for Title VII purposes is a
question that has divided the courts."); Schele v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 198 F. Supp.
2d 979, 989 (N.D. Ind. 2001) ("Determining whether an employee is a supervisor as
opposed to a mere co-worker has been a tricky business for courts .... "); Blackman,
supra note 7, at 144-52 (noting that lower courts have employed different definitions
of "supervisor").
'o' See, e.g., Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323, 334 (4th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that the harasser was not the plaintiffs supervisor because he did not
have authority "to take tangible employment actions" and had only "the occasional
authority to direct her operational conduct"); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill.,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that supervisory authority consists
of the ability to take a tangible employment action); Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 918(E.D. Tenn. 2003) (holding that the trial court's instruction was correct because
supervisory authority must include the ability "to initiate, recommend, or effect
tangible employment actions"); Trigg v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 99-CV-
4730, 2001 WL 868336, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2001) (adopting the Parkins
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appear to have focused mainly on the extent of the alleged
harasser's authority and ability to make economic decisions
affecting the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs
employment. 10 5 Other courts have viewed the term "supervisor"
as "more expansive than as merely including those employees
whose opinions are dispositive on hiring, firing, and
promotion.' 0 6 Although these district courts do not consider the
power to take a tangible employment action to be determinative
of supervisory authority, such authority, according to these
courts, does seem to include more than simply the ability to
direct others' work activities. 1
07
A. The Narrow Definition of the Term "Supervisor"
Shortly after the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the
Seventh Circuit concluded in Parkins v. Civil Constructors of
Illinois, Inc.'°5 that to be a supervisor, an individual must have
"the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline
an employee."'0 9 In Parkins, a truck driver sued her employer,
Civil Constructors, under Title VII alleging hostile work
definition of supervisor), affd, No. 01-9104, 2002 WL 1900463 (2d Cir. Aug. 16,
2002); Jackson v. T & N Van Serv., 86 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (E.D. Penn. 2000)
(relying on the Parkins test).
'05 See, e.g., Mikels, 183 F.3d at 333-34; Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1033-34.
'06 Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 972 (D.
Minn. 1998); see also Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254,
1266 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (including within its definition of "supervisor" the ability to
direct another employee's work activities).
107 Although the Dinkins and Grozdanich holdings include within their broad
definitions of "supervisor" the authority to direct others' work activities, the Mack
court found that this ability to direct was not the only supervisory authority
maintained. Compare Dinkins, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1267-68 (concluding that the
harassers trained and monitored other employees, signed employee timesheets, and
issued warnings to employees), and Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (determining
that the harasser had authority to control the plaintiffs daily activities and to
recommend disciplinary measures), with Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116,
125 (2d Cir.) (concluding that the harasser directed the particulars of the plaintiffs
work day, including her work assignments), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003).
'08 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998).
'o9 Id. at 1034. Prior to the Ellerth and Faragher decisions, the Seventh Circuit,
as well as other circuits, "made an effort to maintain a line between low-level
supervisors who were the equivalent of [coworkers] and supervisors whose authority
and power was sufficient to make consequential employment decisions affecting the
subordinate, such that the supervisor was effectively acting on the employer's
behalf." Id. at 1033 & n.1 (identifying cases prior to Ellerth and Faragher where the
supervisor's authority included the power to take tangible employment actions).
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environment and retaliation.1" ° The plaintiff alleged that two of
her harassers, foremen Strong and Charles Boeke, were her
supervisors."' The Seventh Circuit noted that Title VII provides
no definition of the term "supervisor" and determined that it had
to base its understanding of the term on agency principles and
the purpose of Title VII." 2 The court held that "the essence of
supervisory status is the authority to affect the terms and
conditions of the victim's employment."' 1 3  Applying this
standard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that neither Strong nor
Boeke was the plaintiffs supervisor for purposes of imputing
liability to Civil Constructors, because both were members of
labor unions, had only minimal authority, and could only
recommend, but not take any, tangible employment action."
4
Another illustration of the courts' narrow interpretation of
the term "supervisor" is the Fourth Circuit case, Mikels v. City of
Durham."5 In Mikels, the plaintiff, a police officer for the city of
Durham, alleged that another member of her squad, Corporal
Robert Acker, created a hostile work environment."1 6 The Fourth
Circuit evaluated what conduct is "aided by the agency relation,"
and concluded that the determining factor is: whether there is a
continuing threat to the victim's employment conditions that
makes the victim "vulnerable to and defenseless against the
particular conduct in ways that comparable conduct by a mere
co-worker would not."' " The court indicated that an individual's
ability to take tangible employment actions, even if not exercised,
is the most powerful indicator of such vulnerability."8 Applying
these factors, the Fourth Circuit concluded that although Acker
was the plaintiffs superior in rank, he was not her supervisor,
because he did not have authority to take tangible employment
actions and had only occasional authority to direct her
... See id. at 1031.
.. Id. at 1032-33.
2 Id. at 1033.
"l Id. at 1034.
114 Id. at 1034-35.
... 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1999).
116 Id. at 326-28 (describing the hostile work environment as primarily one
incident where Acker "grabbed Mikels on each side of her face, pulled her to him,
and kissed her on the mouth" and then "shadow-box[ed]" at Mikels' face).
117 Id. at 333.
118 Id.
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operational conduct." 9
B. The Broad Definition of the Term "Supervisor"
Other courts have not defined the term "supervisor" as
narrowly. For example, in Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA,
Inc., 120 the district court rejected the Parkins test for one that
involved a "multi-factorial analysis" of the employment
relationship rather than a "simplistic taxonomy.' 121  The
plaintiffs, female employees at a chicken processing plant,
alleged that their supervisors created a hostile work environment
by making sexual comments and improperly touching
employees. 122  The Dinkins court held that an employee is a
supervisor when the employee has "actual authority to take
tangible employment actions, or to recommend tangible
employment actions if his [or her] recommendations are given
substantial weight by the final decisionmaker, or to direct
another employee's day-to-day work activities in a manner that
may increase the employee's workload or assign additional or
undesirable tasks."'' 23  In the absence of such actual authority,
the Dinkins court concluded that an employee would also qualify
as a supervisor if the employee had apparent authority to
supervise, provided that the victim reasonably believed that the
harasser possessed supervisory authority. 124 Given the
harassers' ability to train and to monitor employees, to sign
timesheets, and to issue written warnings, the court concluded
"9 Id. at 334. The Fourth Circuit also considered the plaintiffs level of isolation
from higher management, as well as the plaintiffs response to the harassment ("an
obscenity and profanity-laced outburst," rejection of his apology, and filing a
grievance the next day), which demonstrated a lack of vulnerability and
defenselessness. Id.
120 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (M.D. Ala. 2001). In rejecting the narrow Parkins
definition of "supervisor," the Mack court cited Dinkins as an illustration of a case
where the court did not define so narrowly the term "supervisor." See Mack v. Otis
Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003).
121 Dinkins, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (rejecting the Parkins test because "it
improperly truncates the Supreme Court's holdings in Faragher and Ellerth").
122 Id. at 1258-61 (describing in detail the unwelcome comments and touching to
which the plaintiffs were subjected).
123 Id. at 1266 (citations omitted).
124 See id. at 1266-67 ("Determining whether an employee reasonably believed
that the harasser was a supervisor means considering the totality of the
circumstances," including "the overall work environment, the structural rigidity of
the workforce hierarchy, and the relationship among all employees, supervisors, and
managers.").
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that the plaintiffs had provided substantial evidence that the
alleged harassers were either actual or apparent agents of the
employer. 125  Therefore, although the Dinkins court included
within its definition of "supervisor" the ability to direct another
employee's work activities, the harassers seemingly possessed
much greater supervisory authority.
Similarly, in Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center,
Inc.,'26 the district court adopted a broader definition of the term
"supervisor" that did not rely solely on an individual's ability to
take tangible employment actions. 127  In Grozdanich, the
plaintiff, a staff nurse, alleged that a charge nurse sexually
harassed her.128 The court concluded that the charge nurse was a
supervisor for Title VII purposes, because he had authority to
control the plaintiffs daily activities, to evaluate the plaintiffs
performance, and to make recommendations regarding hiring,
firing, and disciplining. 29 The court reasoned that adopting the
narrow definition of "supervisor" might allow an employer to
insulate itself from liability "simply by directing all critical
personnel decisions to be effected by a personnel department,
which may have no direct, and only infrequent contact with the
employee subject to the harassment.' 30 Although it rejected the
narrow Parkins definition, the Grozdanich court relied on more
than the harasser's ability to direct work activities, and took into
account the harasser's ability to recommend tangible
125 Id. at 1267-68 (determining that it would be "natural" for employees to view
the harassers as "extensions of management, with the authority to act on behalf of
the company").
126 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. Minn. 1998).
127 See id. at 972 (stating that the Ellerth and Faragher decisions make it clear
that the Supreme Court views the term "supervisor" as more expansive than the
ability to decide issues of hiring, firing, and promotion).
128 Id. at 961-63 (describing plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment).
129 Id. at 971, 973.
130 Id. at 973 (expressing concern that a limited construction of the term
"supervisor" would enable a company to insulate itself from the application of
Ellerth and Faragher). The court's argument has been criticized because it is
unrealistic to think that employers would be able to, or want to, reorganize their
companies in such a manner. See Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F.
Supp. 2d 904, 916 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) ("[T]here is no reason to believe companies will
ever be able to eschew the evaluative and administrative processes so completely
that personnel decisions are formulated and influenced solely by individuals who
have never had any contact with the subject employee."); Blackman, supra note 7, at
151 (criticizing the Grozdanich court's argument of reorganization as being
economically unwise for companies).
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employment actions."'
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF "SUPERVISOR" IS Too
BROAD
The Second Circuit may have extended the definition of the
term "supervisor" too far by relying on the EEOC enforcement
guidelines and decisions of the courts that did not define
"supervisor" so narrowly First, the definition seems inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's Ellerth and Faragher decisions.
Second, the Second Circuit's definition seems to contradict the
definition of "supervisor" provided in the NLRA. Finally, the
Second Circuit's broad definition could have negative
implications for companies, particularly with respect to
supervising, training, and monitoring.
A. The Second Circuit's Decision Is Inconsistent with Ellerth
and Faragher
The Second Circuit seems to have expanded the definition of
"supervisor" beyond what the Supreme Court intended in Ellerth
and Faragher. For example, the Mack court considered Connolly
a supervisor, because his authority over the plaintiff simply
"enabled or materially augmented" his ability to create a hostile
work environment for the plaintiff."' While the Supreme Court
did not expressly state that a supervisor must have the ability to
take a tangible employment action, it did state that "[tangible
employment actions fall within the special province of the
supervisor." '  Connolly had no power to take tangible
employment actions against the plaintiff, or even to recommend
such actions.'34 Even if one interprets Faragher as including
within the scope of supervisory authority the ability to directly
control and supervise all aspects of the victim's day-to-day
131 Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 973 (stating that there is no reason to
distinguish between "supervisors who manage their subordinates' daily activities,
but who can only recommend significant personnel decisions, and supervisors who
have plenary authority over all such matters").
132 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.) (rejecting the Parkins
test for one that asks "whether the authority given by the employer to the employee
enabled or materially augmented the ability of the latter to create a hostile work
environment for his or her subordinates"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003).
133 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998).
114 Mack, 326 F.3d at 126 (recognizing that Connolly had no authority to take a
tangible employment action against the plaintiff).
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activities,'35 Connolly's authority did not appear to rise to that
level. At most, Connolly seemed to have a merely routine or
clerical responsibility of allocating the work assigned by
management. 3 6 In fact, even the EEOC's enforcement guidelines
distinguish between individuals who direct employees' work
activities and those who simply relay other officials' instructions
regarding work assignments. 137
The Second Circuit seemed to overstate the mechanic's level
of isolation from management as well as the harasser's "special
dominance" over the other mechanics. 38  For example, in
Faragher, the plaintiff and the alleged harassers were stationed
at a beach, where the plaintiff had no significant contact with
city officials.'39 In contrast, the mechanic's supervisor, Phil
Gallina, maintained an office at the Metropolitan Life building. 40
Although Gallina was seldom on site, he was accessible to the
plaintiff, because she testified that she complained repeatedly to
Gallina about Connolly's behavior. 14' Further, the plaintiff in
' Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
136 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing Connolly's job
responsibilities). The plaintiff maintained that "as part of [Connolly's]
responsibilities in assigning and overseeing daily tasks, Connolly also assigned
overtime work; the defendants counter[ed] that this was merely a clerical
responsibility." Mack, 326 F.3d at 121. The defendants' argument seems to be based
on the fact that under the NLRA, an employee would not qualify as a supervisor if
his or her authority was of a merely routine or clerical nature. See infra notes 165-
67 and accompanying text (explaining the three-part test to determine whether an
employee qualifies as a supervisor under the NLRA's definition of "supervisor").137 See supra Part I.C (providing background information on the EEOC
enforcement guidelines).
... Mack, 326 F.3d at 125 ('There was no one superior to Connolly at 200 Park
whose continuing presence might have acted as a check on Connolly's coercive
misbehavior toward other Otis employees there."); see also Expanding the Definition
of a "Supervisor" and a Company's Liability for Workplace Harassment, EMP. L.
ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP), Oct. 2003, at 2 [hereinafter Expanding the Definition
of a "Supervisor'] (arguing that Otis managers were close by and that there was not
the same level of isolation from management that was present in Faragher).
"9 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 781. The Court noted that the alleged harassers had
"'unchecked authority"' and that "Faragher and her colleagues were 'completely
isolated from the city's higher management."' Id. at 808 (quoting Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1544 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part), rev'd, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). For example, the Marine Safety
Headquarters, where the lifeguards worked, was a "small one-story building
containing an office, a meeting room, and a single, unisex locker room with a
shower." Id. at 781.
140 Mack, 326 F.3d at 120.
141 Id. at 120-21.
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Faragher was completely unaware of the city's sexual
harassment policy, which likely would have provided a
mechanism for reporting to management complaints of sexual
harassment.1 42  The plaintiff in Mack, however, was aware of
Otis's policy and knew there were several avenues of complaint
available to her. 1
43
Finally, the Second Circuit's rejection of the Parkins test
appears to be based on a misreading of Ellerth and Faragher.'
4
For example, the Second Circuit rejected the Parkins test for
focusing improperly on an employee's ability to take a tangible
employment action.'45 According to the Second Circuit, "Ellerth
and Faragher hold that an employer may be vicariously liable
even for the misbehavior of employees who do not take tangible
employment actions against their subordinate victims."'' 46  In
fact, the Supreme Court seemed to be contemplating two
different factual scenarios-one where a supervisor took a
tangible employment action and one where a supervisor had the
authority to, but did not take, a tangible employment action-not
two different types of supervisors. 141 More specifically, the
Supreme Court explained that an employer is automatically
liable when a supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible
employment action, but that the employer is subject to an
affirmative defense when the supervisor does not take a tangible
employment action. 148 The Court did not indicate that the latter
type of liability involved an employee having a lesser degree of
supervisory authority.'4 9 Rather the difference between the two
142 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 782 (indicating that many of the employees of the
Marine Safety Section were unaware of the city's sexual harassment policy because
the city failed to disseminate its policy to the Section).
143 Mack, 326 F.3d at 121; see also Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor,"
supra note 138, at 2 (pointing out that the plaintiff knew she could complain to Otis
human resources, the Otis ombudsman, or by calling an "800" telephone number).
144 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 126 (disagreeing with the Parkins test for determining
who qualifies as a supervisor); see also Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P.,
286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 915-16 (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (explaining that the Second Circuit
missed the point when it rejected the Parkins test); Expanding the Definition of a
"Supervisor," supra note 138, at 2 (arguing that the Second Circuit's reasoning was
flawed in its attempt to distinguish the Parkins decision).
141 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 126.
146 Id.
147 See Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.
148 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
149 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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bases of liability appears to be focused on whether the supervisor
actually took a tangible employment action, or simply had the
power to do so.'50
B. The Second Circuit's Decision Is Inconsistent with the
NLRA 1
51
The Second Circuit's definition of "supervisor" seemingly
contradicts the definition of "supervisor" provided in the
NLRA.152 This contradiction is particularly significant in Mack,
because both the plaintiff and the alleged supervisor were
150 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 ("No affirmative defense is available, however,
when the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such
as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.!'); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-
08; see also Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (concluding that whether a hostile work
environment should be attributed to the employer is a question of whether the
employee had the ability to take a tangible employment action, and not whether the
action was taken).
15' The NLRA, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
provides covered employees "the right to self-organiz[e] .... to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing.... to engage in other concerted
activities" related to collective bargaining, and to refrain from engaging in such
activities. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (providing for
rights of covered employees). Congress initially enacted the NLRA in 1935 to
empower employees and to alleviate obstructions to commerce caused by labor-
management disputes. See id. § 151 (findings and policies); see also Harry G.
Hutchison, Toward a Robust Conception of "Independent Judgment". Back to the
Future?, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 336 (2002) (explaining the motivation behind the
enactment of the NLRA); Kristin Hay O'Neal, Note, NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corporation of America: Possible Implications for Supervisory Status
Analysis of Professionals Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 BAYLOR L. REV.
841, 844 (1995) (providing an overview of the "political purpose and the societal
backdrop upon which the NLRA was founded").
152 Compare Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.) (adopting a
test for determining who qualifies as a supervisor based on "whether the authority
given by the employer to the employee enabled or materially augmented the ability
of the latter to create a hostile work environment for his or her subordinates"), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1016 (2003), with 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding specifically from the
term "employee" any individual employed as a supervisor), and id. § 152(11)(defining the term "supervisor"). Under the NLRA, the term "supervisor" includes
the following individuals:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
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members of the same bargaining unit.' Since the NLRA
expressly excludes supervisory employees from the bargaining
units of their subordinates, 5 4 Connolly was clearly not a
supervisor under the NLRA. The union contract provisions
designating Connolly as the "mechanic in charge" did not make
him a supervisor, because he still "remained an hourly-paid
bargaining unit employee covered by a union contract.
'1 55
Therefore, it seems rather ironic that the Second Circuit used
these union contract provisions to make Connolly a supervisor for
Title VII purposes when he was not even a supervisor under the
union contract or under the NLRA.
156
While the NLRA definition of "supervisor" has no effect on
the meaning of the term for Title VII purposes,'57 the reasoning
behind why supervisory employees are excluded from the
bargaining units of their subordinates under the NLRA is similar
to the rationale behind the vicarious liability of employers for
harassment by their supervisors. For example, supervisory
employees are excluded from the bargaining units of their
subordinates because they are considered "agents" of their
'13 See Mack, 326 F.3d at 120 (describing the collective bargaining agreement
between Otis Elevator and the Local 1 International Union of Elevator Constructors,
of which the plaintiff and Connolly were both members).
'14 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (providing that "the term 'employee' ... shall not
include ... any individual employed as a supervisor"). The NLRA, as originally
enacted, did not distinguish between employees and supervisors. It was not until the
enactment of the LMRA that supervisors were specifically excluded from the NLRA's
definition of the term "employee." See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-
198, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935); see also Kevin J. Hasson & Crystal L.
Miller, Labor Law-Limiting an Employer's Liability for Firing a Supervisor for
Union Activity, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 270, 271-72 (1983) (tracing the history of
the NLRA).
115 Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor," supra note 138, at 2; see also
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the alleged harassers were not supervisors because both were members
of labor unions and had only minimal authority over the plaintiff). In making its
determination that the harassers were not supervisors, the Seventh Circuit also
relied on the fact that both men "were laborers who were required to account for
their time on a time card, were paid an hourly wage, and received overtime pay." Id.
at 1034.
156 See Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor," supra note 138, at 2 (stating
that it was "ironic that the Otis union contract provisions ... made Connolly a
supervisor for vicarious liability purposes when he [was] not even a supervisor under
that contract or under long-standing NLRB rules defining supervisors").
'57 See EEOC, supra note 2 (recognizing that numerous statutes, including the
NLRA, contain and define the term "supervisor," but noting that these definitions do
not control the meaning of the term in the employment discrimination statutes).
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employers.' In other words, NLRA supervisors are viewed as
extensions of management, who are more loyal to management
than to their subordinates and who act in the best interests of
their employers.159 Given this loyalty and the employer's ability
to better control supervisors' conduct, employers can be
vicariously liable for conduct that violates the NLRA if the
individual involved was a supervisor rather than a mere
employee.160  Similarly, employers are held vicariously liable
under Title VII for sexual harassment through supervisors,
because supervisors are aided in accomplishing their sexual
harassment by their position as agents of the employer.'16 Under
Title VII, a supervisor has the authority to act on behalf of the
employer, so that "[firom the perspective of the employee, the
supervisor and the employer merge into a single entity."'162
Further, employers are held vicariously liable for a hostile work
environment created by supervisors, because employers have a
greater opportunity to guard against their misconduct. 163
5. Hutchison, supra note 151, at 372 ("It seems vital that a 'supervisor' must
have 'the power to act as an agent of the employer in relations with other employees
and to exercise independent judgment of some nature."') (quoting THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
1610 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d. ed 1992)).
59 Congress enacted the LMRA in an effort to respond to "organized labor's
growing control over management personnel" and to restore equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees. See GAF Corp. v. NLRB, 524 F.2d 492,
495 (5th Cir. 1975) (considering the legislative history of the NLRA); see also O'Neal,
supra note 151, at 844 (explaining that Congress enacted the LMRA to lessen the
imbalance established by the NLRA). Congress was concerned that if supervisors
had the right to organize they might be more loyal to their subordinates than to
management and that their independent judgment might be impaired. See Hasson &
Miller, supra note 154, at 272. Not only did employees have the right to be free from
their supervisors' control, but also employers had the right to have loyal supervisors
who acted in the employer's best interests. See id.; Hutchison, supra note 151, at 341("The exclusion of supervisors from coverage by the Act was approved, inter alia, to
'further the interest[s] of employers in the undivided loyalty of supervisors and the
interest of employees in organizing free of supervisory interference ...."' (alteration
in original) (quoting DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 21
(1999))).
160 See Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor," supra note 138, at 2(explaining that if the alleged harasser made an anti-union comment to the plaintiff,
vicarious liability for that comment would not be imputed to the employer).
161 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759-60 (1998); Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998).
162 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (quoting Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr.,
Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992)).
163 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803.
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Another similarity is that under the NLRA and Title VII, a
distinction should be made between low-level supervisors who
are equivalent to regular employees, and true supervisors who
have been given actual authority by the employer. 164  For
example, under the NLRA's statutory definition, an employee
qualifies as a "supervisor" when: (1) the employee has authority
to hire or transfer or suspend or lay off or recall or promote or
discharge or assign or reward or discipline other employees or
responsibly direct them or to adjust their grievances or
effectively to recommend such action;165 (2) the exercise of that
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but rather
requires the use of independent judgment; and (3) the employee
holds the authority in the interest of the employer.1 66 Under this
definition, supervisors can take tangible employment actions,
recommend such actions, or responsibly direct other employees.
It is important to note, however, that merely assigning tasks to
employees or directing another's work does not suffice to make an
employee a supervisor in the NLRA context. 67  Rather,
supervisory authority includes the ability to assign or to direct
employees, not simply their work activities. 68  Therefore, while
the NLRA definition appears at first glance to be consistent with
the EEOC's Title VII definition of "supervisor," which includes
164 See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir.
1998) (explaining that courts have made an effort to distinguish "between low-level
supervisors who were the equivalent of [coworkers] and supervisors whose authority
and power was sufficient to make consequential employment decisions affecting the
subordinate, such that the supervisor was effectively acting on the employer's
behalf'); see also Becker & Ceresi, supra note 1, at 388-89 (arguing that Congress
did not intend to include within the definition of "supervisor" those employees with
"minor supervisory duties").
165 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) 2000. The twelve
supervisory functions listed in the NLRA should be read disjunctively, so that the
possession by an employee of any of the enumerated supervisory powers or functions
is sufficient to make the employee a "supervisor." See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty.
Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713 (2001) (stating that employees are supervisors under
the NLRA if they "hold the authority to engage in any [one] of the [twelve] listed
supervisory functions"); see also O'Neal, supra note 151, at 846 n.25.
166 Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 713; see also Hutchison, supra note 151, at 342;
O'Neal, supra note 151, at 846.
167 See Becker & Ceresi, supra note 1, at 398-404 (suggesting a limiting
construction of the terms "assign" and "responsibly direct").
168 See id.; see also Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 720 (suggesting that the NLRB adopt
"a limiting interpretation of the supervisory function of responsible direction by
distinguishing employees who direct the manner of others' performance of discrete
tasks from employees who direct other employees").
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the authority to direct employees' work activities, the NLRA's
definition is actually more limited.'69
C. Negative Implications of the Second Circuit's Definition of
"Supervisor"
The Mack court's definition of "supervisor" will likely expose
employers to an inordinate threat of liability. 70  With the
changing composition of the workforce and a greater number of
employees directing the work of others, the Mack court's
definition of "supervisor" would likely extend vicarious liability to
cover too many employees. 7' "[L]ead men, low-level supervisors,
working supervisors, project or job leaders and even coworkers
with some additional authority [would] all become 'supervisors'
whose actions bind their employer."'' 72  Although requiring an
employer, rather than an innocent employee, to automatically
bear the cost of a hostile work environment created by all
employees may seem desirable at some level, it does not seem to
be the result intended by Congress or the Supreme Court and it
could have adverse effects on companies. 73
169 See supra Part I.C (describing the EEOC's enforcement guidelines).
Interestingly, just as the authority to direct and assign has caused confusion in the
Title VII context, it has been troublesome in the NLRA context as well. See Becker &
Ceresi, supra note 1, at 389. Perhaps this ambiguity is due to the fact that the
authority to take or to recommend a tangible employment action clearly places
employees who possess such authority apart from other employees, while the
authority to assign or to direct is not as distinguishable. See id.
170 See Blackman, supra note 7, at 155-56 (arguing that a broad construction of
the term "supervisor" may expose employers to an excessive and unfair threat of
liability); see also Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1016 (2003); supra note 152 and accompanying text (describing the Mack
test).
171 See Hutchison, supra note 151, at 335-36 (explaining how changes in the
workforce will inevitably lead to problems distinguishing between supervisors and
regular employees under the NLRA); O'Neal, supra note 151, at 855-60 (describing
changes in the employment setting, which are leading to a greater number of
employees directing the work of others).
172 Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor," supra note 138, at 1; see also
Browne v. Signal Mountain Nursery, L.P., 286 F. Supp. 2d 904, 915 (E.D. Tenn.
2003) ("gU]nder the logic of the Mack/EEOC approach, vicarious liability should be
extended even further to cover any and all employees with any sort of superiority
over a plaintiff-employee.").
113 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800 (1998) (rejecting "scope-of-
employment" as a basis for vicarious liability because under scope of employment
reasoning it would seem just as appropriate to require employers to bear the cost of
a hostile work environment created by coworkers as when it was created by
supervisors).
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The Second Circuit's broad and far-reaching definition of
"supervisor" will likely discourage employers from taking
preventive measures, one of the basic policies of Title VII. 7 4 In
fact, "[t]he more nebulous the standard for determining which
employees are supervisors, the less incentive there is for
companies to engage in preventive forethought." '75 For example,
if an employer cannot determine who qualifies as a supervisor,
there may simply be too many employees for the company to
carefully select, train, and monitor. 176 In contrast, companies can
guard against supervisor harassment more easily when they
have a clear understanding of the standards of liability, and
there is a limited number of potential supervisors.
177
Finally, it is possible that the Mack court's definition of
"supervisor" will make it more difficult for companies to
implement proper training programs, because employers may not
know what type of training employees need.178 Supervisors need
to be trained not only to demonstrate that the employer is taking
proper steps to prevent sexual harassment, but also to ensure
that supervisors understand the employer's policy and know how
to handle properly any complaints. 79  Employers should also
train non-supervisory employees, but should do so in separate
174 See Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 914 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06) (stating that the Mack
definition of "supervisor" is inconsistent with the Title VII policy of encouraging
forethought by employers).
175 Id.
176 Seyfarth Shaw, Prevention and Response: What Works, What Doesn't?, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 137, 160 (Benjamin E. Griffith ed.,
2001) (stating that careful selection, training, and monitoring of supervisors is an
employer's only defense to being vicariously liable for supervisor sexual
harassment).
177 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800-01 (recognizing that "employer[s] can guard
against [supervisors'] misbehavior more easily because their numbers are by
definition fewer than the numbers of regular employees"); see also Browne, 286 F.
Supp. 2d at 914 (explaining that the Mack court's definition of "supervisor" is
contrary to the Court's rationale in Ellerth and Faragher, because it will result in a
large number of potential supervisors).
178 See Expanding the Definition of a "Supervisor," supra note 138, at 3
(suggesting that the Second Circuit's definition of "supervisor" makes it difficult for
employers to determine who to invite to the training sessions for supervisors).
179 See EEOC, supra note 2; see also Shaw, supra note 176, at 157-58.
Supervisors should be trained to recognize sexual harassment, to understand their
reporting responsibilities, to respond properly to any complaints brought by
subordinate employees, to maintain confidentiality, and how to avoid allegations of
sexual harassment. See id. at 164-66.
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sessions because of their different responsibilities. 8 0 Therefore,
it seems that employers that cannot distinguish between regular
employees and supervisors may not be protecting themselves
properly by providing inadequate training.
IV. How COURTS SHOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN COWORKER
AND SUPERVISOR
This Comment suggests that an employee should qualify as a
supervisor for the purposes of finding the employer vicariously
liable under Title VII when the employer has granted to the
employee the authority to recommend or to take tangible
employment actions against his or her subordinates. It is this
actual power to make economic decisions affecting other
employees that distinguishes a supervisor from a mere coworker
and aids the supervisor in creating a hostile work environment.18'
The authority given to a supervisory employee need not be
plenary, but it should include more than simply the ability to
direct another employee's work activities.8 2 Finally, determining
which employees qualify as supervisors should not be based on
title, but requires "a particularized inquiry into the nature and
extent of the authority bestowed upon an employee by an
employer."'
8 3
Defining the term "supervisor" as one who has the authority
to recommend or to take tangible employment actions is
consistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Ellerth and
'80 Shaw, supra note 176, at 160. Non-supervisory employee training should
emphasize the employee's duty to know the employer's policy, to follow the policy, to
report sexual harassment, and to cooperate in investigations by the employer. See
id. at 160-61.
181 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998) ("[W]e can
identify a class of cases where, beyond question, more than the mere existence of the
employment relation aids in commission of the harassment: when a supervisor takes
a tangible employment action against the subordinate."); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800-
01 (noting that supervisors have special authority that enhances their capacity to
harass their subordinates).
182 See Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 918 (holding that a supervisor does not have
to possess absolute authority but rather significant authority "to initiate,
recommend, or effect tangible employment actions"); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills
Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. Minn. 1998) ("The disutility of drawing
any distinction between supervisors who manage their subordinates' daily activities,
but who can only recommend significant personnel decisions, and supervisors who
have plenary authority over all such matters, underscores the Supreme Court's
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth.").
183 Browne, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
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Faragher, as well as the agency principles and Title VII
objectives upon which those decisions relied.'84 For example, an
individual who can make economic decisions affecting other
employees clearly has been vested with the employer's authority
and represents the interests of management." 5 By defining
"supervisor" with precision, the proposed definition also
recognizes that there are limits on "acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible."'' 8 6  In
addition to limiting liability, this precision encourages employers
to exercise forethought and to take measures toward preventing
sexual harassment in the workplace. 87
The proposed definition of "supervisor" seems to be
consistent with the definition of "supervisor" provided in the
NLRA.'88 While this consistency need not exist, it can be helpful
in cases like Mack, where the plaintiff and the alleged harasser
are members of the same bargaining unit.8 9  Further, the
reasons why supervisory employees are excluded from the
bargaining units of their subordinates under the NLRA can be
compared to the rationale behind the vicarious liability of
employers for harassment by their supervisors.' 90 Courts can
draw on these similarities when determining who qualifies as a
supervisor under Title VII.
Finally, while the proposed definition of "supervisor" may
limit vicarious liability, it does not entirely insulate employers
from liability. 9' A plaintiff who suffers a hostile work
'8 See supra Part I.B (explaining the Ellerth and Faragher holdings); see also
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that supervisory authority consists of the ability "to affect the terms and
conditions of the victim's employment").
185 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 ("Tangible employment actions are the means by
which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
subordinates ... [and] requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act."); see
also supra Part III.B (explaining how the NLRA includes within its definition of
"supervisor" the ability to make economic decisions because supervisors are
supposed to be loyal to management and represent the employer's best interests).
186 Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); see also
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 (agreeing with the Meritor Court's holding that employers
are not automatically liable for supervisory harassment).
187 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
188 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000) (defining the term "supervisor").
189 See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
'9' Paul E. Starkman, Learning the New Rules of Sexual Harassment: Faragher,
Ellerth and Beyond, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 317, 326 (1999) ("[M]erely because a court
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environment by a coworker could still recover from the employer,
albeit under a negligence standard, rather than a vicarious
liability standard.' 92 This lesser standard seems fair, however,
since "employers do not entrust mere co-employees with any
significant authority with which they might harass a victim.' '
93
Therefore, the proposed definition seems to strike a balance
between allowing plaintiffs with strong hostile work environment
claims to prevail, and limiting vicarious liability for the acts of
those employees over whom the employer has sufficient control.
CONCLUSION
Employers may be vicariously liable for a hostile work
environment created by a supervisor, whereas they may be liable
under a negligence standard when a hostile work environment is
created by a mere coworker. Accordingly, it is critical to
determine whether the harassing employee qualifies as a
supervisor for Title VII purposes. This Comment has suggested
that the Second Circuit defined too broadly the term "supervisor,"
as one whose authority "enabled or materially augmented" his or
her ability to "create a hostile work environment."'194 Had the
Second Circuit focused instead on whether the employee had the
authority to take or to recommend a tangible employment action,
its Mack holding would have been consistent with the Supreme
Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher, as well as the agency
principles and Title VII objectives upon which the Court relied.
Further, the Second Circuit's definition of "supervisor" would not
have contradicted the definition of "supervisor" provided in the
NLRA. Finally, defining "supervisor" as one who has the
authority to take or to recommend tangible employment actions
would not leave employers wondering where all of their
employees have gone.
applies a negligence rather than a strict liability standard to co-worker harassment
does not mean that the employer can escape liability.").
192 See id.; see also supra note 6.
"' See Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.
1998).
'94 Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1016 (2003).
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